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CORPORATIONS - DISSOLUTION AND FORFEITURE
OF FRANCHISE - EVIDENCE
Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339
(Ore. 1967).
Dilution of a minority shareholder's interest by the issuance of
new stock is a common problem in close corporations. Probably
the best source of protection for the minority shareholder in the di-
lution or "squeeze out"' situation is the doctrine of preemptive
rights.2 However, when the shareholder is financially unable to ex-
ercise his preemptive rights to purchase newly issued stock, the courts
have been somewhat hesitant to grant relief,3 although a minority
view does exist.'
In accord with this minority view, it has been held that the par-
ties who control the corporation stand in the position of fiduciaries
both to the corporation and to the minority shareholders, and that
such controlling parties may not act in such a way as to diminish
the minority's proportionate interest5 unless such conduct is
prompted by a material and substantial need of the corporation,6
I The following example illustrates the typical dilution or "squeeze oue' situation:
Assume that X owns 100 shares in B Corporation, which has 1,000 shares
of capital stock outstanding, and Y and Z each have 450 shares. If Y and
Z cause the corporation to issue an additional 1,000 shares of stock, which
they in some way acquire for themselves, obviously they cut in half the per-
centage of the business owned by X. Repeated issues of stock can of course
result in further dilution of X's interest F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPUL-
SION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASsociATEs 91 (1961).
2 "The shareholder's preemptive right is his right to preempt or to purchase before
others a new issue of shares in proportion to his present interests in the corporation."
E. HENN, CORPORATIONS § 177 (1961). By exercising his preemptive rights, the
minority shareholder obviously may preserve his proportionate interest in the business.
3 In this respect the courts apparently have been influenced in part by the "generaljudicial policy of refusing to interfere in the internal affairs of a corporation." 2 F.
O'NEAL, CLOS1 CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRAcricE 120 (1958).
4 See Schwab v. Schwab-Wilson Mach. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 55 P.2d 1268
(1936); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953);
Canada S. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 96 A.2d 810 (Ch.
1953); Gamble v. Queens Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
5More fully explicated, the minority position holds that the shareholders have the
right to expect that the officers and directors will not use their positions for their own
personal advantage, and that they will not issue stock or conduct themselves generally
in such a way as to obtain or retain control of the corporation. Schwab v. Schwab-
Wilson Mach. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 1, 3, 55 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1936). See also H.
HENN, supra note 2, §§ 176, 241.
6 In accordance with the entrenched majority view, "most courts will probably sus-
tain a new issue of shares if a plausible case can be made that the corporation needs
additional capital." F. O'NEAL & J. DERWIN, supra note 1, at 96; see Thom v. Balti-
more Trust Co., 158 Md. 352, 148 A. 234 (1930); Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc &
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i.e., a legitimate business purpose.7
Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp.' is a recent case which poses
some of the major problems attendant upon the determination of
whether such a legitimate business purpose exists. Browning, a
minority shareholder, brought an action for liquidation against the
directors of the corporation on the grounds that the directors had
caused new stock to be issued to themselves at a time when they
knew that Browning was financially unable to exercise his preemp-
tive rights and that this recapitalization scheme reduced Browning's
interest in the corporation from 32 percent to 1 percent. In re-
versing the trial court's denial of relief, the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon held that the ostensible purpose of the recapitalization was to
squeeze out the plaintiff,' and implied that the recapitalization was
neither necessary nor of any material benefit to the corporation."0
Accordingly, the court concluded that such conduct was wrongful
and oppressive as proscribed by the statute pleaded by Browning."
In reaching its somewhat questionable holding, the majority of
the court found the following facts. When first organized, the
corporation had authorized 1,000 shares of no par value stock, of
which Browning was the recognized owner of 320 shares.' The
corporation operated at a loss' 3 until some time after its second fiscal
year, which ended on July 31, 1962. The corporation was in debt
to two trusts in an amount approaching $500,000. By the end of
the third fiscal year, July 31, 1963, it became clear that the corpora-
Iron Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 211, 37 A. 539 (Ch. 1897); H. BALLANTMINE, CORPORATIONS
§ 209 (rev. ed. 1946).
7 flallantine has concluded that "ffthe reason [for the exception] is based upon
practical convenience and the exercise of discretion of the directors in making new
issues of shares to accomplish corporate purposes." H. BALLANTn, supra note 6,
at 490.
8 434 P.2d 339 (Ore. 1967).
9 
"[The only demonstrable purpose served by the increase of stock was to provide
the tools with which to drastically reduce the interest of Browning in the corporation."
Id. at 343.
10 Id.
11OR13. REV. STAT. § 57.595 (Supp. 1961) provides in part: "(1) The Circuit
courts shall have full power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation ...
[where] the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are illegal, op-
pressive or fraudulent." Apparently no case prior to the instant one had arisen under
this statute.
12 Of the remaining shares, Campbell, the financier and leader of the majority
shareholders, owned 20 shares. Defendant Thomason had 160 shares, while defend-
ants Winn and Riddlesbarger, the trustees of two trusts set up by Campbell for the
benefit of his daughters, each owned 250 shares. 434 P.2d at 340.
1athe annual report for fiscal 1962 showed an operating deficit of more than
$200,000. Id. at 341.
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tion was making a profit for the first time in its history.'4 Nine
months previously, however, the shareholders had adopted a res-
olution 5 to increase the number of authorized shares from 1,000
to 500,000.16 On December 14, 1962, a preemptive stock allot-
ment was given to Browning. The court concluded that "[the
defendant-directors knew that it was financially impossible for
Browning to exercise this pre-emptive right, either in full or for any
substantial part of it. It was, and it was intended to be, an eviction
notice."'17 Browning in fact could not exercise his preemptive
rights. Sometime after the expiration of the preemptive right pe-
riod, the directors, at a special meeting, authorized all of the defend-
ant-shareholders to subscribe for any amount of the new stock.'"
Browning had no notice of the meeting and thus was not afforded
the same opportunity. Approximately 31,000 shares were pur-
chased;"9 the squeeze out was completed. Although "[ilt was stated
14 Id.
15 This was only 3 months after the second annual report showing the considerable
losses. Browning had notice of the meeting but did not attend.
I, The court apparently placed great emphasis on the inference that the directors
could have known that the corporation was emerging into a successful enterprise:
At what time in the [third] fiscal year it could have been foreseen that the
corporation was emerging into a profitable operation is not found in the
record. It is possible to infer that sometime during that fiscal year the de-
fendant-directors could have known that the organizational and operational
problems of the corporation's business had been resolved and that future
profitable operation could have been anticipated. 434 P.2d at 341.
This language indicates that the court was proceeding on the weak implication that if a
profitable operation could reasonably have been foreseen by the directors, this would
tend to negate the need for recapitalization. See text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
17 434 P.2d at 341. Browning would have been allowed to subscribe for up to 151,-
696 shares of new stock at $1 per share. While admitting that the certificate did not
compel him to subscribe and pay for the entire amount, the court emphasized that
"Browning considered that this was the effect of the certificate." Moreover, Browning
would have had to expend a considerable sum to retain any "meaningful proportionate
interest in the corporation." Id. For a contrary and equally persuasive opinion as to
the effect of the certificate received by Browning, see id. at 345 (dissenting opinion).
18 The court used language clearly unfavorable to the directors, e.g., "immediately
following the expiration of the pre-emptive right period." Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
Actually, the period expired on January 17, 1963, and the directors' authorization was
given on February 11, 1963 - almost 1 month later.
19 Each of the two trusts was issued 10,454 shares; payment was in the form of can-
cellation of part of the debt owing to the trusts. Thomason was issued 10,240 shares;
payment was by exchange of an unpaid salary claim. Campbell was issued 32 shares.(In the aggregate, 31,180 shares were issued. This represented a cancellation of cor-
porate debt in the same amount, since each share had a value of $1. See note 23 infra.
However, the court apparently did not see fit to observe this fact as legitimate business
purpose). "Browning's interest in the corporation was reduced from 32 percent to one
percent. He was not... given any opportunity to subscribe for the drastically reduced
amount of stock that would have retained his proportionate shares." 434 P.2d at 342.
Browning also had an unpaid salary claim and he should have been given the same
opportunity, or so the court felt. See id. at 343. However, there was considerable evi-
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that it was necessary to permit the trustees to have a greater par-
ticipation in the profits and to permit cancellation of overdue cor-
poration notes due them as trustees,""0 and although there was
testimony "that the need for the additional paper capitalization
was to enable them [the directors] to permit public sale of the stock
[and] to provide a better ratio 'between capitalization and debt
.... "21 the court nevertheless concluded that no legitimate business
purpose existed.2
On the other hand, by drawing inferences which perhaps were
more realistic under the circumstances, the dissent found the same
facts to be considerably more favorable to the directors with respect
to the question of a legitimate business purpose. In October 1962,
when the additional stock was authorized, the corporation's financial
picture was far from encouraging. 3 Since attempts to secure con-
ventional loans probably would not have been feasible and since fed-
eral loans were not available, 4 additional capital could be obtained
only by further shareholder loans, or by the issuance of more stock. 5
Whereas the majority of the court merely inferred that the directors
could have known that the corporation was emerging into a success-
dence that he had failed to perform the job for which he was originally awarded his
shares. Id. at 340. While his unpaid salary claim was dearly disputed (it was already
the source of another litigation), the court felt that it must have had some value.
20 434 P.2d at 342 (emphasis added). Query if the cancellation of overdue notes
is not a legitimate business purpose.
211d.; see note 28-29 infra & accompanying text.
2 2 The difficulty with accepting [the defendant's] explanations [of a legiti-
mate business purpose] ... is that none of them were accomplished, or even
attempted.
... The large debt of the corporation was not materially reduced. The
ratio of the debt to the paid-in capital stock was only nominally changed....
[D]efendants did not attempt to explain how the increase of stock ... accom-
plished any of the business purposes they claimed for the entire transaction.
The only tangible result of the increase of the stock and the amount issued
was the elimination of Browning's 32 percent interest in the corporation.
434 P.2d at 342.
Query if the payment of legitimate corporation debts by means of cancellation and the
issuance of shares is not a legitimate business purpose even if the consequent change of
debt ratio is only nominal, when the fact that the corporation was making a profit had
become known.
23 Current liabilities were $227,000, while current assets were $117,000. Capital
stock was a mere $1,000, and long term loans were in the amount of $440,000 (of
which $320,000 was owing to the trustees). The continuing existence of the trustees'
only source of income, which upon receipt was immediately handed over to the cor-
poration, was always questionable. Id. at 344. The dissent concluded that the directors
could have reasonably decided that the corporation needed more capital. Id.
24 Id.
2 5 The inadvisability of the majority shareholders making further loans was ap-
parent. There would be "no opportunity for a greater share of the profits with the
plaintiffs continuing to hold 32 percent of the stock." Id. at 345.
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ful operation,26 the dissent's more realistic conclusion was that the
corporation needed additional capital, that conventional loans were
not feasible, and that a new stock issue was the only practical alter-
native. 7 While the majority found it difficult to accept the direc-
tors' explanation that the new stock was issued for business pur-
poses, because none of the purposes was accomplished or at-
tempted,28 the dissent responded that this failure was due to changed
business and economic conditions.29 The dissent unfortunately did
not take advantage of several bolstering arguments which are ex-
amined in depth in the footnote.0 °
26 See note 16 supra.
27 434 P.2d at 346-47.
2 8 See note 22 supra & accompanying text.
29 434 P.2d at 346-47.
3o At the end of fiscal 1962, the financial picture showed a huge deficit. Accord-
ingly, the new stock was authorized. When the purchases were completed in Febru-
ary 1963, the need for long term additional capital had decreased. The corporation's
financial position was dearly improving because the huge deficit of the prior year
had been erased and had been changed to retained earnings by the end of fiscal 1963,
and in addition a considerable part of the debt owed to the trustees had been reduced
beginning in March 1963. In other words there was little need for going public at this
time - the stock was too valuable to be sold at $1 per share to the public and at the
same time it was a valuable investment for the defendants.
Secondly, the debt-capital ratio was reduced from 320:1 to 10:1 by the issuance of
approximately 31,000 new shares of stock. This smaller ratio was advantageous - a
legitimate business purpose - to the corporation because it not only cancelled or paid
off substantial corporate debts, but also because it was favorable for income tax pur-
poses. Id. at 347. The dissenting judge probably could have bolstered his argument
by expounding upon the tax aspect as a legitimate business purpose. In brief, the sig-
nificant issue would be whether the original financial arrangement between the cor-
poration and the trustee-shareholders gave rise to a valid debtor-creditor relationship,
or whether it merely gave rise to a contribution to capital on their part With respect
to the repayment by the corporation of the amount advanced by these shareholders, if
it were found that a true debtor-creditor relationship existed, then a deduction properly
taken for the interest paid on the indebtedness under section 163(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 would benefit the corporation. On the other hand, if it were
found that the financial arrangement did not create a valid debt, then the payments
would be considered to be distributions of property by the corporation under section
301(a), and would be accorded dividend treatment under sections 301(c) and 316.
In all probability, substantial tax benefits would accrue to the corporation in the former
situation, whereas substantial taxes would likely be assessed in the latter. For these
reasons it would obviously behoove corporate management to take the necessary safe-
guards to insure that the status of the shareholder advances are properly regarded as
loans.
Many tests are utilized in the determination of whether or not a particular financial
arrangement really amounts to a loan. One such test involves the debt-capital ratio.
While this test is not exclusively relied upon, it nonetheless continues to be of influ-
ence. Essentially, the theory is that the greater the ratio, the more likely it is that the
Internal Revenue Service will conclude that the shareholder advances are in reality
contributions to capital, and not loans, i.e., an attempt at tax avoidance. See Gerver,
De-Emphasis of Debt-Equity Test for Thin Corporations Requires New Defense Tac-
tics, 23 J. TAXATION 28, 31 (1965). That the Internal Revenue Service would not
fail to scrutinize, and perhaps see through, such an arrangement is a foregone conclu-
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The court appears to have placed the burden of proof on the
directors to show that the new issue of stock was prompted by a
legitimate business purpose. Ordinarily this stiff burden has re-
mained with the complaining shareholder.31 Apparently the only
direct evidence in this case was that Browning had not done the
job for which he had received his 320 shares and that the defend-
sion. Viewed in a different light, however, it has been held that the avoidance of tax
is not an improper purpose of corporate management; or, conversely put, that it is a
legitimate business purpose. See Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 128
(2d Cir. 1956).
The inescapable conclusion of the dissent in Browning, of course, is that the direc-
tors' conduct, leading to a substantial decrease in the debt-capital ratio, amounted to a
legitimate business purpose. For an excellent discussion of this and many relevant,
complex issues, see Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: 'Thin Capitali-
zation" and Related Problems, 16 TAX L REv. 1 (1960). On a similar vein, the dis-
sent possibly could have used the lowered debt-capital ratio to show perhaps an even
more substantial legitimate business purpose. The financial plight of the corporation
at this time was obvious; conceivably, the directors may have feared that they and the
other shareholders were running the risk of losing their limited corporate liability -
that is, of becoming liable as partners to their creditors. Although the courts have
generally been hesitant to disregard the corporate entity in order to grant relief to
creditors where there has been a showing of inadequate capitalization, at least several
California courts have been so inclined. Automotriz Del Golfo De California v. Res-
nick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957); Temple v. Bodega Bay Fisheries, Inc., 180
Cal. App. 2d 279, 4 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1960). Both courts quoted with approval the
following language:
If a corporation is organized and carries on business without substantial
capital in such a way that the corporation is likely to have no sufficient assets
available to meet its debts, it is inequitable that shareholders should set up
such a flimsy organization to escape personal liability. The attempt to do
corporate business without providing any sufficient basis of financial respon-
sibility to creditors is an abuse of the separate entity and will be ineffectual
to exempt the shareholders from corporate debts. It is coming to be recog-
nized as the policy of the law that shareholders should in good faith put at
the risk of the business unincumbered capital reasonably adequate for its
prospective liabilities. If the capital is illusory or trifling compared with
the business to be done and the risks of loss, this is a ground for denying the
separate entity privilege. H. BALLANTIN, supra note 6, at 302-03.
A final argument could have been made regarding the reduced debt-capital ratio.
The corporation had been operating in the red, and the facts fairly warranted the in-
ference that further capital was needed. Ordinarily, such capital could have been ob-
tained by any of three sources: shareholder loans, conventional loans, or by the issu-
ance of more stock. Unfortunately, as explained in notes 25 and 26 supra and accom-
panying text, the former two sources were not in fact available. However, by issuing
the new shares in exchange for claims against the corporation, the directors considerably
enhanced the corporation's credit picture. Although this change was only nominal
(no new capital actually flowed into the corporation), there now existed an opportunity
to secure further capital: with a debt-capital ratio of but 10:1, financial institutions
conceivably would have been much more willing to extend credit to the corporation.
In brief, the reduced debt-capital ratio and the inferences arising therefrom possibly
could have been better exploited by the dissent.
31 "[rln jurisdictions where the courts have shown a disposition to protect minority
shareholders against freeze outs by the issuance of additional stock, the burden of proof
that a complaining shareholder must bear to get relief is a heavy one." 2 F. O'NWAL,
supra note 3, at 123-24. See generally C. McCoRtMIc, EviDEN CE §§ 306-07 (1954).
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ants intended to squeeze him out of the corporation." It is con-
tended here that, in arriving at its decision that no legitimate busi-
ness purpose existed, the court was influenced primarily by the
directors' professed intent to squeeze out Browning. By so holding,
the Oregon Supreme Court has considerably relaxed the degree of
proof usually required of a minority shareholder seeking judicial
relief.33 In effect, this line of reasoning will tend to minimize the
significance of the legitimate business purpose test. The dissent in
Browning ably demonstrated that the facts of the case could cer-
tainly give rise to reasonable inferences that such a purpose existed.
Yet four justices saw fit, where the facts did not clearly show a
legitimate business purpose, to impliedly conclude that the test for
relief should be whether the intent or primary purpose of the ma-
jority shareholders was to squeeze out the minority, notwithstanding
a possible or incidental benefit to the corporation.34
Browning was a case of first impression in the State of Oregon.
Although, as a general rule, the courts have been somewhat hesi-
tant to interfere in intracorporate matters,35 there appears to be an
emerging view that one of the hallmarks of the close corporation
32 434 P.2d at 340, 342. In view of the language throughout the entire opinion, it
apparently was no secret that the defendants were not happy with Browning's perform-
ance, and, to say the least, would have been delighted to be rid of him.
There are only a few cases in which the courts apparently have been equally influ-
enced by the majority shareholders' intent or "primary purpose" of freezing out the
minority. This minority view is expressed in Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34
Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953) and Canada S. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration
Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 96 A.2d 810 (Ch. 1953). Contra, Hyman v. Velsicol Corp., 342
Ill. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951). However, one authority on close corporations
feels that the minority view may be emerging as the majority view. See 2 F. O'NEAL,
supra note 3, at 122-24.
33 This is a clear departure from the strict tests announced in other jurisdictions.
In Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cit. 1953), the court stated that
"To warrant the interposition of the court in favor of the minority share-
holders ... a case must be plainly made out which shows that such action is
so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the
clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any
honest desire to secure such interests, but that he must have acted with an
intent to subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to
the company, and in a manner inconsistent with its interests." Id. at 433-
34 (emphasis added), quoting from Gamble v. Queens County Water Co.,
123 N.Y. 91, 25 N.E. 201 (1890).
34 The court observed that other "courts have given relief when the purpose of the
increased stock issue is only for the benefit of the majority and serves no corporate pur-
pose," and then went on to say that "the only demonstrable purpose served by the in-
crease of stock was to ... reduce the interest of Browning in the corporation." 434
P.2d at 343. It seems difficult to believe that the court could honestly say that no legiti-
mate business purpose was served by the stock issue. Hence the necessity for asserting
the court's implied conclusion.
35 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
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is its fiduciary characteristics, and that perhaps the courts should be
more willing to grant relief to the minority shareholder in the
squeeze out situation."u The impact of the decision is of course not
shattering. Proof of the legitimate business purpose remains a
significant factor; however, the burden of proof does seem to have
been shifted from the minority to the majority shareholders. This
is not to say that bare proof of intent on the part of the majority to
squeeze out the minority is enough to obtain relief. Nor is this
court's result without support, for the burden has been shifted in
this manner in other areas of corporate law." In addition, it has
already been pointed out that other courts are becoming more will-
ing to grant relief in such cases.3" Whether the Browning deci-
sion will have any influence in other jurisdictions is difficult to
conjecture. Although the more conservative courts will naturally
tend to follow the entrenched majority view, 9 the decision really
does not represent a radical departure from traditional theories, and
accordingly it will probably find acceptance in many jurisdictions.4"
WALLACE J. MAYER, JR.
836Mr. Justice Brandeis has said: 'The majority has the right to control; but when
it does so, it occupies a fiduciary position toward the minority .... Southern Pac. Co.
v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919). See generally F. O'NEAL & J. DmERWIN, supra
note 1, § 5.15; 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 3, § 8.07; H. HENN, supra note 2, §§ 231,
236, 241.
37 In Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 183 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Va. 1960),
it was presumed that a contract between the corporation and its officers was invalid;
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the officers' burden of proving good faith in
transactions involving commingled business interests. In Shlensky v. South Parkway
Bldg. Corp., 19 IMI. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960), the Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed an appellate decision denying relief to the minority shareholder, holding that
transactions between corporations having common directors are presumptively unfair
and that the directors had the burden of overcoming the presumption. The essence of
these and related cases is their conflict of interest issue. Where the fiduciary problem
is the fundamental issue, it appears that the courts have decided that a shifting of the
burden of proof will more readily effectuate justice. While these cases are not directly
on point, it would certainly seem that they would lend support, in principle, for the
court's decision in the instant case.
Similarly, there is legislative support for this type of result. The purpose of section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964), whereby defendants find
themselves effectually saddled with the burden of proof, was the avoidance of the con-
siderable common law difficulties generally encountered by plaintiff-purchasers of se-
curities. For an excellent summary of these difficulties, see Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
38 For discussions pertaining to the fiduciary theory in close corporations, see note
37 supra & accompanying text. There is additional support for this theory in the
analogous area of partnerships, particularly limited partnerships. While perhaps the
analogy is rough, it nonetheless appears to have some influence in corporate law. See
H. OLECK, MODERN CoapoRAnioN LAW § 189 (student ed. 1960).
3 9S ee note 6 supra & accompanying text.
4 0 It is interesting to note that the decision is no windfall for the minority share-
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